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from common import xmpp
from common import helpers

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from common import exceptions
import random
import string
import math
import os
import time
from common import dh
import xmpp.c14n
from Crypto.Cipher import AES
from Crypto.Hash import HMAC, SHA256
import base64
class StanzaSession(object):
def __init__(self, conn, jid, thread_id, type):
self.conn = conn
self.type = type
if thread_id:
self.received_thread_id = True
self.thread_id = thread_id
else:
self.received_thread_id = False
if type == 'normal':
self.thread_id = None
else:
self.thread_id = self.generate_thread_id()
self.last_send = 0
self.status = None
def generate_thread_id(self):
return "".join([random.choice(string.letters) for x in xrange(0,32)])
def send(self, msg):

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if self.thread_id and isinstance(msg, xmpp.Message):
msg.setThread(self.thread_id)
msg.setAttr('to', self.jid)
self.conn.send_stanza(msg)

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if isinstance(msg, xmpp.Message):
self.last_send = time.time()
def reject_negotiation(self, body = None):
msg = xmpp.Message()
feature = msg.NT.feature
feature.setNamespace(xmpp.NS_FEATURE)
x = xmpp.DataForm(typ='submit')
x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='FORM_TYPE', value='urn:xmpp:ssn'))
x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='accept', value='0'))
feature.addChild(node=x)
if body:
msg.setBody(body)
self.send(msg)
self.cancelled_negotiation()
def cancelled_negotiation(self):
'''A negotiation has been cancelled, so reset this session to its default state.'''
self.status = None
self.negotiated = {}
def terminate(self):
msg = xmpp.Message()
feature = msg.NT.feature
feature.setNamespace(xmpp.NS_FEATURE)
x = xmpp.DataForm(typ='submit')
x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='FORM_TYPE', value='urn:xmpp:ssn'))
x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='terminate', value='1'))
feature.addChild(node=x)
self.send(msg)
self.status = None
def acknowledge_termination(self):
# we could send an acknowledgement message here, but we won't.
self.status = None
# an encrypted stanza negotiation has several states. i've represented them as the following values in the 'status'
# attribute of the session object:
# 1. None:
# default state
# 2. 'requested-e2e':
# this client has initiated an esession negotiation and is waiting for
# a response
# 3. 'responded-e2e':
# this client has responded to an esession negotiation request and is
# waiting for the initiator to identify itself and complete the
# negotiation
# 4. 'identified-alice':
# this client identified itself and is waiting for the responder to
# identify itself and complete the negotiation
# 5. 'active':
# an encrypted session has been successfully negotiated. messages of
# any of the types listed in 'encryptable_stanzas' should be encrypted
# before they're sent.
# the transition between these states is handled in gajim.py's
# handle_session_negotiation method.
class EncryptedStanzaSession(StanzaSession):
def __init__(self, conn, jid, thread_id, type = 'chat'):
StanzaSession.__init__(self, conn, jid, thread_id, type = 'chat')
self.xes = {}
self.es = {}
self.enable_encryption = False
self._kc_s = None
# _o denotes 'other' (ie. the client at the other end of the session)
self._kc_o = None
# keep the encrypter updated with my latest cipher key
def set_kc_s(self, value):
self._kc_s = value
self.encrypter = self.cipher.new(self._kc_s, self.cipher.MODE_CTR, counter=self.encryptcounter)
def get_kc_s(self):
return self._kc_s
# keep the decrypter updated with the other party's latest cipher key
def set_kc_o(self, value):
self._kc_o = value
self.decrypter = self.cipher.new(self._kc_o, self.cipher.MODE_CTR, counter=self.decryptcounter)
def get_kc_o(self):
return self._kc_o
kc_s = property(get_kc_s, set_kc_s)
kc_o = property(get_kc_o, set_kc_o)
# convert a large integer to a big-endian bitstring
def encode_mpi(self, n):
if n >= 256:
return self.encode_mpi(n / 256) + chr(n % 256)
else:
return chr(n)
# convert a large integer to a big-endian bitstring, padded with \x00s to 16 bytes
def encode_mpi_with_padding(self, n):
ret = self.encode_mpi(n)
mod = len(ret) % 16
if mod != 0:
ret = ((16 - mod) * '\x00') + ret
return ret
# convert a big-endian bitstring to an integer
def decode_mpi(self, s):
if len(s) == 0:
return 0
else:
return 256 * self.decode_mpi(s[:-1]) + ord(s[-1])
def encryptcounter(self):
self.c_s = (self.c_s + 1) % (2 ** self.n)
return self.encode_mpi_with_padding(self.c_s)
def decryptcounter(self):
self.c_o = (self.c_o + 1) % (2 ** self.n)
return self.encode_mpi_with_padding(self.c_o)
def encrypt_stanza(self, stanza):
encryptable = filter(lambda x: x.getName() not in ('error', 'amp', 'thread'), stanza.getChildren())
# XXX can also encrypt contents of <error/> elements in stanzas @type = 'error'
# (except for <defined-condition xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-stanzas'/> child elements)
old_en_counter = self.c_s
for element in encryptable:
stanza.delChild(element)
plaintext = ''.join(map(str, encryptable))
m_compressed = self.compress(plaintext)
m_final = self.encrypt(m_compressed)
c = stanza.NT.c
c.setNamespace('http://www.xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0200.html#ns')
c.NT.data = base64.b64encode(m_final)
# XXX check for rekey request, handle <key/> elements
m_content = ''.join(map(str, c.getChildren()))
c.NT.mac = base64.b64encode(self.hmac(self.km_s, m_content + self.encode_mpi(old_en_counter)))
return stanza
def hmac(self, key, content):
return HMAC.new(key, content, self.hash_alg).digest()
def sha256(self, string):
sh = SHA256.new()
sh.update(string)
return sh.digest()
base28_chr = "acdefghikmopqruvwxy123456789"
def sas_28x5(self, m_a, form_b):
sha = self.sha256(m_a + form_b + 'Short Authentication String')
lsb24 = self.decode_mpi(sha[-3:])
return self.base28(lsb24)
def base28(self, n):
if n >= 28:
return self.base28(n / 28) + self.base28_chr[n % 28]
else:
return self.base28_chr[n]
def generate_initiator_keys(self, k):
return (self.hmac(k, 'Initiator Cipher Key'),
self.hmac(k, 'Initiator MAC Key'),
self.hmac(k, 'Initiator SIGMA Key') )
def generate_responder_keys(self, k):
return (self.hmac(k, 'Responder Cipher Key'),
self.hmac(k, 'Responder MAC Key'),
self.hmac(k, 'Responder SIGMA Key') )
def compress(self, plaintext):
if self.compression == None:
return plaintext
def decompress(self, compressed):
if self.compression == None:
return compressed
def encrypt(self, encryptable):
len_padding = 16 - (len(encryptable) % 16)
if len_padding != 16:
encryptable += len_padding * ' '
return self.encrypter.encrypt(encryptable)
def random_bytes(self, bytes):
return os.urandom(bytes)
def generate_nonce(self):
def decrypt_stanza(self, stanza):
c = stanza.getTag(name='c', namespace='http://www.xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0200.html#ns')
stanza.delChild(c)
# contents of <c>, minus <mac>, minus whitespace
macable = ''.join(map(str, filter(lambda x: x.getName() != 'mac', c.getChildren())))
received_mac = base64.b64decode(c.getTagData('mac'))
calculated_mac = self.hmac(self.km_o, macable + self.encode_mpi_with_padding(self.c_o))
if not calculated_mac == received_mac:
raise 'bad signature (%s != %s)' % (repr(received_mac), repr(calculated_mac))
m_final = base64.b64decode(c.getTagData('data'))
m_compressed = self.decrypt(m_final)
plaintext = self.decompress(m_compressed)
try:
parsed = xmpp.Node(node='<node>' + plaintext + '</node>')
except:

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raise exceptions.DecryptionError
for child in parsed.getChildren():
stanza.addChild(node=child)
return stanza
def decrypt(self, ciphertext):
return self.decrypter.decrypt(ciphertext)
def logging_preference(self):
if gajim.config.get('log_encrypted_sessions'):
return ["may", "mustnot"]
else:
return ["mustnot", "may"]
def get_shared_secret(self, e, y, p):
if (not 1 < e < (p - 1)):
raise exceptions.NegotiationError, "invalid DH value"
return self.sha256(self.encode_mpi(self.powmod(e, y, p)))
def c7lize_mac_id(self, form):
kids = form.getChildren()
macable = filter(lambda x: x.getVar() not in ('mac', 'identity'), kids)
return ''.join(map(lambda el: xmpp.c14n.c14n(el), macable))
def verify_alices_identity(self, form, e):
m_a = base64.b64decode(form['mac'])
id_a = base64.b64decode(form['identity'])
m_a_calculated = self.hmac(self.km_o, self.encode_mpi(self.c_o) + id_a)
if m_a_calculated != m_a:
raise exceptions.NegotiationError, 'calculated m_a differs from received m_a'
# check for a retained secret
# if none exists, prompt the user with the SAS
if self.sas_algs == 'sas28x5':
self.sas = self.sas_28x5(m_a, self.form_b)
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mac_a = self.decrypt(id_a)
form_a2 = self.c7lize_mac_id(form)
mac_a_calculated = self.hmac(self.ks_o, self.n_s + self.n_o + self.encode_mpi(e) + self.form_a + form_a2)
if mac_a_calculated != mac_a:
raise exceptions.NegotiationError, 'calculated mac_a differs from received mac_a'
def verify_bobs_identity(self, form, sigmai):
m_b = base64.b64decode(form['mac'])
id_b = base64.b64decode(form['identity'])
m_b_calculated = self.hmac(self.km_o, self.encode_mpi(self.c_o) + id_b)
if m_b_calculated != m_b:
raise exceptions.NegotiationError, 'calculated m_b differs from received m_b'
mac_b = self.decrypt(id_b)
pubkey_b = ''
c7l_form = self.c7lize_mac_id(form)
content = self.n_s + self.n_o + self.encode_mpi(self.d) + pubkey_b
if sigmai:
self.form_b = c7l_form
content += self.form_b
else:
form_b2 = c7l_form
content += self.form_b + form_b2
mac_b_calculated = self.hmac(self.ks_o, content)
if mac_b_calculated != mac_b:
raise exceptions.NegotiationError, 'calculated mac_b differs from received mac_b'
def make_alices_identity(self, form, e):
form_a2 = ''.join(map(lambda el: xmpp.c14n.c14n(el), form.getChildren()))
old_c_s = self.c_s
content = self.n_o + self.n_s + self.encode_mpi(e) + self.form_a + form_a2
mac_a = self.hmac(self.ks_s, content)
id_a = self.encrypt(mac_a)
m_a = self.hmac(self.km_s, self.encode_mpi(old_c_s) + id_a)
# check for a retained secret
# if none exists, prompt the user with the SAS
if self.sas_algs == 'sas28x5':
self.sas = self.sas_28x5(m_a, self.form_b)
if self.sigmai:
self.check_identity()
return (xmpp.DataField(name='identity', value=base64.b64encode(id_a)), \
xmpp.DataField(name='mac', value=base64.b64encode(m_a)))
def make_bobs_identity(self, form, d):
pubkey_b = ''
form_b2 = ''.join(map(lambda el: c14n.c14n(el), form.getChildren()))
content = self.n_o + self.n_s + self.encode_mpi(d) + pubkey_b + self.form_b + form_b2
old_c_s = self.c_s
mac_b = self.hmac(self.ks_s, content)
id_b = self.encrypt(mac_b)
m_b = self.hmac(self.km_s, self.encode_mpi(old_c_s) + id_b)
return (xmpp.DataField(name='identity', value=base64.b64encode(id_b)), \
xmpp.DataField(name='mac', value=base64.b64encode(m_b)))
def negotiate_e2e(self, sigmai):
request = xmpp.Message()
feature = request.NT.feature
feature.setNamespace(xmpp.NS_FEATURE)
x = xmpp.DataForm(typ='form')
x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='FORM_TYPE', value='urn:xmpp:ssn', typ='hidden'))
x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='accept', value='1', typ='boolean', required=True))
# this field is incorrectly called 'otr' in XEPs 0116 and 0217
x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='logging', typ='list-single', options=self.logging_preference(), required=True))
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# unsupported options: 'disabled', 'enabled'
x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='disclosure', typ='list-single', options=['never'], required=True))
x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='security', typ='list-single', options=['e2e'], required=True))
x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='crypt_algs', value='aes128-ctr', typ='hidden'))
x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='hash_algs', value='sha256', typ='hidden'))
x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='compress', value='none', typ='hidden'))
# unsupported options: 'iq', 'presence'
x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='stanzas', typ='list-multi', options=['message']))
x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='init_pubkey', value='none', typ='hidden'))
x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='resp_pubkey', value='none', typ='hidden'))
x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='ver', value='1.0', typ='hidden'))
x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='rekey_freq', value='4294967295', typ='hidden'))
x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='sas_algs', value='sas28x5', typ='hidden'))
self.n_s = self.generate_nonce()
x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='my_nonce', value=base64.b64encode(self.n_s), typ='hidden'))
modp_options = [ 5, 14, 2, 1 ]
x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='modp', typ='list-single', options=map(lambda x: [ None, x ], modp_options)))
x.addChild(node=self.make_dhfield(modp_options, sigmai))
self.sigmai = sigmai
self.form_a = ''.join(map(lambda el: xmpp.c14n.c14n(el), x.getChildren()))
feature.addChild(node=x)
self.status = 'requested-e2e'
self.send(request)
def verify_options_bob(self, form):
negotiated = {}
not_acceptable = []
ask_user = {}
fixed = { 'disclosure': 'never',
'security': 'e2e',
'crypt_algs': 'aes128-ctr',
'hash_algs': 'sha256',
'compress': 'none',
'stanzas': 'message',
'init_pubkey': 'none',
'resp_pubkey': 'none',
'ver': '1.0',
self.sas_algs = 'sas28x5'
self.cipher = AES
self.hash_alg = SHA256
self.compression = None
for name, field in map(lambda name: (name, form.getField(name)), form.asDict().keys()):
options = map(lambda x: x[1], field.getOptions())
values = field.getValues()
if not field.getType() in ('list-single', 'list-multi'):
options = values
if name in fixed:
if fixed[name] in options:
else:
not_acceptable.append(name)
elif name == 'rekey_freq':
preferred = int(options[0])
negotiated['rekey_freq'] = preferred
elif name == 'logging':
my_prefs = self.logging_preference()
if my_prefs[0] in options:
pref = my_prefs[0]
negotiated['logging'] = pref
else:
for pref in my_prefs:
if pref in options:
ask_user['logging'] = pref
break
if not 'logging' in ask_user:
not_acceptable.append(name)
else:
# XXX some things are handled elsewhere, some things are not-implemented
pass
return (negotiated, not_acceptable, ask_user)
# 4.3 esession response (bob)
def respond_e2e_bob(self, form, negotiated, not_acceptable):
response = xmpp.Message()
feature = response.NT.feature
feature.setNamespace(xmpp.NS_FEATURE)
x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='FORM_TYPE', value='urn:xmpp:ssn'))
x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='accept', value='true'))
for name in negotiated:
x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name=name, value=negotiated[name]))
self.negotiated = negotiated
# the offset of the group we chose (need it to match up with the dhhash)
group_order = 0
self.modp = int(form.getField('modp').getOptions()[group_order][1])
x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='modp', value=self.modp))
g = dh.generators[self.modp]
p = dh.primes[self.modp]
self.n_o = base64.b64decode(form['my_nonce'])
dhhashes = form.getField('dhhashes').getValues()

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self.He = base64.b64decode(dhhashes[group_order].encode("utf8"))
self.n_s = self.generate_nonce()
self.c_o = self.decode_mpi(self.random_bytes(bytes)) # n-bit random number
self.c_s = self.c_o ^ (2 ** (self.n - 1))
self.y = self.srand(2 ** (2 * self.n - 1), p - 1)
self.d = self.powmod(g, self.y, p)
to_add = { 'my_nonce': self.n_s,
'dhkeys': self.encode_mpi(self.d),
'counter': self.encode_mpi(self.c_o),
'nonce': self.n_o }
for name in to_add:
b64ed = base64.b64encode(to_add[name])
x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name=name, value=b64ed))
self.form_a = ''.join(map(lambda el: xmpp.c14n.c14n(el), form.getChildren()))
self.form_b = ''.join(map(lambda el: xmpp.c14n.c14n(el), x.getChildren()))
self.status = 'responded-e2e'
feature.addChild(node=x)
if not_acceptable:
pass
# XXX
# <error code='406' type='modify'>
# <not-acceptable xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-stanzas'/>
# <feature xmlns='http://jabber.org/protocol/feature-neg'>
# <field var='security'/>
# </feature>
# </error>
# 'Alice Accepts'
def verify_options_alice(self, form):
negotiated = {}
ask_user = {}
not_acceptable = []
if not form['logging'] in self.logging_preference():
not_acceptable.append(form['logging'])
elif form['logging'] != self.logging_preference()[0]:
ask_user['logging'] = form['logging']
else:
negotiated['logging'] = self.logging_preference()[0]
return (negotiated, not_acceptable, ask_user)
# 'Alice Accepts', continued
def accept_e2e_alice(self, form, negotiated):
self.encryptable_stanzas = ['message']
self.sas_algs = 'sas28x5'
self.cipher = AES
self.hash_alg = SHA256
self.compression = None
accept = xmpp.Message()
feature = accept.NT.feature
feature.setNamespace(xmpp.NS_FEATURE)
result = xmpp.DataForm(typ='result')
self.c_s = self.decode_mpi(base64.b64decode(form['counter']))
self.c_o = self.c_s ^ (2 ** (self.n - 1))
self.n_o = base64.b64decode(form['my_nonce'])
mod_p = int(form['modp'])
p = dh.primes[mod_p]
x = self.xes[mod_p]
e = self.es[mod_p]
self.d = self.decode_mpi(base64.b64decode(form['dhkeys']))
self.k = self.get_shared_secret(self.d, x, p)
result.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='FORM_TYPE', value='urn:xmpp:ssn'))
result.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='accept', value='1'))
result.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='nonce', value=base64.b64encode(self.n_o)))
self.kc_s, self.km_s, self.ks_s = self.generate_initiator_keys(self.k)
if self.sigmai:
self.kc_o, self.km_o, self.ks_o = self.generate_responder_keys(self.k)
self.verify_bobs_identity(form, True)
else:
secrets = gajim.interface.list_secrets(self.conn.name, self.jid.getStripped())
rshashes = [self.hmac(self.n_s, rs) for rs in secrets]
# XXX add some random fake rshashes here
rshashes.sort()
rshashes = [base64.b64encode(rshash) for rshash in rshashes]
result.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='rshashes', value=rshashes))
result.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='dhkeys', value=base64.b64encode(self.encode_mpi(e))))
self.form_b = ''.join(map(lambda el: xmpp.c14n.c14n(el), form.getChildren()))
# MUST securely destroy K unless it will be used later to generate the final shared secret
for datafield in self.make_alices_identity(result, e):
result.addChild(node=datafield)
feature.addChild(node=result)
self.send(accept)
if self.sigmai:
self.status = 'active'
self.enable_encryption = True
else:
self.status = 'identified-alice'
# 4.5 esession accept (bob)
def accept_e2e_bob(self, form):
response = xmpp.Message()
init = response.NT.init
init.setNamespace('http://www.xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0116.html#ns-init')
x = xmpp.DataForm(typ='result')
for field in ('nonce', 'dhkeys', 'rshashes', 'identity', 'mac'):
assert field in form.asDict(), "alice's form didn't have a %s field" % field
# 4.5.1 generating provisory session keys
e = self.decode_mpi(base64.b64decode(form['dhkeys']))
p = dh.primes[self.modp]
self.kc_o, self.km_o, self.ks_o = self.generate_initiator_keys(k)
# 4.5.2 verifying alice's identity
# 4.5.4 generating bob's final session keys
srs = ''
secrets = gajim.interface.list_secrets(self.conn.name, self.jid.getStripped())
rshashes = [base64.b64decode(rshash) for rshash in form.getField('rshashes').getValues()]
for secret in secrets:
if self.hmac(self.n_o, secret) in rshashes:
srs = secret
break
# other shared secret, we haven't got one.
# XXX I can skip generating ks_o here
self.kc_s, self.km_s, self.ks_s = self.generate_responder_keys(k)
self.kc_o, self.km_o, self.ks_o = self.generate_initiator_keys(k)
# 4.5.5
if srs:
srshash = self.hmac(srs, 'Shared Retained Secret')
else:
srshash = self.random_bytes(32)
x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='FORM_TYPE', value='urn:xmpp:ssn'))
x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='nonce', value=base64.b64encode(self.n_o)))
x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='srshash', value=base64.b64encode(srshash)))
form_b2 = ''.join(map(lambda el: xmpp.c14n.c14n(el), x.getChildren()))
old_c_s = self.c_s

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mac_b = self.hmac(self.ks_s, self.n_o + self.n_s + self.encode_mpi(self.d) + self.form_b + form_b2)
id_b = self.encrypt(mac_b)
m_b = self.hmac(self.km_s, self.encode_mpi(old_c_s) + id_b)
x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='identity', value=base64.b64encode(id_b)))
x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='mac', value=base64.b64encode(m_b)))
init.addChild(node=x)
self.send(response)
if self.negotiated['logging'] == 'mustnot':
self.loggable = False
self.status = 'active'
self.enable_encryption = True
def final_steps_alice(self, form):
srs = ''
secrets = gajim.interface.list_secrets(self.conn.name, self.jid.getStripped())
for secret in secrets:
if self.hmac(secret, 'Shared Retained Secret') == srshash:
srs = secret
break
k = self.sha256(self.k + srs + oss)
del self.k
# don't need to calculate ks_s here
self.kc_s, self.km_s, self.ks_s = self.generate_initiator_keys(k)
self.kc_o, self.km_o, self.ks_o = self.generate_responder_keys(k)
# Note: If Alice discovers an error then she SHOULD ignore any encrypted content she received in the stanza.
if self.negotiated['logging'] == 'mustnot':
self.loggable = False
self.status = 'active'
self.enable_encryption = True
# calculate and store the new retained secret
# prompt the user to check the remote party's identity (if necessary)
def do_retained_secret(self, k, srs):
new_srs = self.hmac(k, 'New Retained Secret')
account = self.conn.name
bjid = self.jid.getStripped()
if srs:
gajim.interface.replace_secret(account, bjid, srs, new_srs)
else:
self.check_identity()
gajim.interface.save_new_secret(account, bjid, new_srs)
# generate a random number between 'bottom' and 'top'
def srand(self, bottom, top):
# minimum number of bytes needed to represent that range
bytes = int(math.ceil(math.log(top - bottom, 256)))
# in retrospect, this is horribly inadequate.
return (self.decode_mpi(self.random_bytes(bytes)) % (top - bottom)) + bottom
def make_dhfield(self, modp_options, sigmai):
dhs = []
for modp in modp_options:
p = dh.primes[modp]
g = dh.generators[modp]
# XXX this may be a source of performance issues
e = self.powmod(g, x, p)
if sigmai:
dhs.append(base64.b64encode(self.encode_mpi(e)))
name = 'dhkeys'
else:
He = self.sha256(self.encode_mpi(e))
dhs.append(base64.b64encode(He))
name = 'dhhashes'
return xmpp.DataField(name=name, typ='hidden', value=dhs)
# a faster version of (base ** exp) % mod
# taken from <http://lists.danga.com/pipermail/yadis/2005-September/001445.html>
def powmod(self, base, exp, mod):
square = base % mod
result = 1
while exp > 0:
if exp & 1: # exponent is odd
result = (result * square) % mod
square = (square * square) % mod
exp /= 2
return result
def terminate_e2e(self):
self.terminate()
self.enable_encryption = False
def acknowledge_termination(self):
StanzaSession.acknowledge_termination(self)
self.enable_encryption = False

Brendan Taylor
committed
def fail_bad_negotiation(self, reason):
'''they've tried to feed us a bogus value, send an error and cancel everything.'''
err = xmpp.Error(xmpp.Message(), xmpp.ERR_FEATURE_NOT_IMPLEMENTED)
err.T.error.T.text.setData(reason)
self.send(err)
self.status = None
account = self.conn.name
no_log_for = gajim.config.get_per('accounts', account, 'no_log_for')
if not no_log_for:
no_log_for = ''
no_log_for = no_log_for.split()
return self.loggable and account not in no_log_for and self.jid not in no_log_for