Skip to content
GitLab
Explore
Sign in
Register
Primary navigation
Search or go to…
Project
gajim
Manage
Activity
Members
Labels
Plan
Issues
Issue boards
Milestones
Wiki
Code
Merge requests
Repository
Branches
Commits
Tags
Repository graph
Compare revisions
Snippets
Build
Pipelines
Jobs
Pipeline schedules
Artifacts
Deploy
Releases
Model registry
Operate
Environments
Monitor
Incidents
Analyze
Value stream analytics
Contributor analytics
CI/CD analytics
Repository analytics
Model experiments
Help
Help
Support
GitLab documentation
Compare GitLab plans
Community forum
Contribute to GitLab
Provide feedback
Keyboard shortcuts
?
Snippets
Groups
Projects
Show more breadcrumbs
Weblate
gajim
Commits
8d79d320
Commit
8d79d320
authored
17 years ago
by
Brendan Taylor
Browse files
Options
Downloads
Patches
Plain Diff
three message negotiation
parent
59358691
No related branches found
Branches containing commit
No related tags found
Tags containing commit
No related merge requests found
Changes
1
Hide whitespace changes
Inline
Side-by-side
Showing
1 changed file
src/common/stanza_session.py
+143
-90
143 additions, 90 deletions
src/common/stanza_session.py
with
143 additions
and
90 deletions
src/common/stanza_session.py
+
143
−
90
View file @
8d79d320
...
...
@@ -305,8 +305,104 @@ class EncryptedStanzaSession(StanzaSession):
return
[
"
may
"
,
"
mustnot
"
]
else
:
return
[
"
mustnot
"
,
"
may
"
]
def
get_shared_secret
(
self
,
e
,
y
,
p
):
if
(
not
1
<
e
<
(
p
-
1
)):
raise
exceptions
.
NegotiationError
,
"
invalid DH value
"
return
self
.
sha256
(
self
.
encode_mpi
(
self
.
powmod
(
e
,
y
,
p
)))
def
c7lize_mac_id
(
self
,
form
):
kids
=
form
.
getChildren
()
macable
=
filter
(
lambda
x
:
x
.
getVar
()
not
in
(
'
mac
'
,
'
identity
'
),
kids
)
return
''
.
join
(
map
(
lambda
el
:
xmpp
.
c14n
.
c14n
(
el
),
macable
))
def
verify_alices_identity
(
self
,
form
,
e
):
m_a
=
base64
.
b64decode
(
form
[
'
mac
'
])
id_a
=
base64
.
b64decode
(
form
[
'
identity
'
])
m_a_calculated
=
self
.
hmac
(
self
.
km_o
,
self
.
encode_mpi
(
self
.
c_o
)
+
id_a
)
def
negotiate_e2e
(
self
):
if
m_a_calculated
!=
m_a
:
raise
exceptions
.
NegotiationError
,
'
calculated m_a differs from received m_a
'
# check for a retained secret
# if none exists, prompt the user with the SAS
if
self
.
sas_algs
==
'
sas28x5
'
:
self
.
sas
=
self
.
sas_28x5
(
m_a
,
self
.
form_b
)
mac_a
=
self
.
decrypt
(
id_a
)
form_a2
=
self
.
c7lize_mac_id
(
form
)
mac_a_calculated
=
self
.
hmac
(
self
.
ks_o
,
self
.
n_s
+
self
.
n_o
+
self
.
encode_mpi
(
e
)
+
self
.
form_a
+
form_a2
)
if
mac_a_calculated
!=
mac_a
:
raise
exceptions
.
NegotiationError
,
'
calculated mac_a differs from received mac_a
'
def
verify_bobs_identity
(
self
,
form
,
sigmai
):
m_b
=
base64
.
b64decode
(
form
[
'
mac
'
])
id_b
=
base64
.
b64decode
(
form
[
'
identity
'
])
m_b_calculated
=
self
.
hmac
(
self
.
km_o
,
self
.
encode_mpi
(
self
.
c_o
)
+
id_b
)
if
m_b_calculated
!=
m_b
:
raise
exceptions
.
NegotiationError
,
'
calculated m_b differs from received m_b
'
mac_b
=
self
.
decrypt
(
id_b
)
pubkey_b
=
''
c7l_form
=
self
.
c7lize_mac_id
(
form
)
content
=
self
.
n_s
+
self
.
n_o
+
self
.
encode_mpi
(
self
.
d
)
+
pubkey_b
if
sigmai
:
form_b
=
c7l_form
content
+=
form_b
else
:
form_b2
=
c7l_form
content
+=
self
.
form_b
+
form_b2
mac_b_calculated
=
self
.
hmac
(
self
.
ks_o
,
content
)
if
mac_b_calculated
!=
mac_b
:
raise
exceptions
.
NegotiationError
,
'
calculated mac_b differs from received mac_b
'
def
make_alices_identity
(
self
,
form
,
e
):
form_a2
=
''
.
join
(
map
(
lambda
el
:
xmpp
.
c14n
.
c14n
(
el
),
form
.
getChildren
()))
old_c_s
=
self
.
c_s
content
=
self
.
n_o
+
self
.
n_s
+
self
.
encode_mpi
(
e
)
+
self
.
form_a
+
form_a2
mac_a
=
self
.
hmac
(
self
.
ks_s
,
content
)
id_a
=
self
.
encrypt
(
mac_a
)
m_a
=
self
.
hmac
(
self
.
km_s
,
self
.
encode_mpi
(
old_c_s
)
+
id_a
)
# check for a retained secret
# if none exists, prompt the user with the SAS
if
self
.
sas_algs
==
'
sas28x5
'
:
self
.
sas
=
self
.
sas_28x5
(
m_a
,
self
.
form_b
)
return
(
xmpp
.
DataField
(
name
=
'
identity
'
,
value
=
base64
.
b64encode
(
id_a
)),
\
xmpp
.
DataField
(
name
=
'
mac
'
,
value
=
base64
.
b64encode
(
m_a
)))
def
make_bobs_identity
(
self
,
form
,
d
):
pubkey_b
=
''
form_b2
=
''
.
join
(
map
(
lambda
el
:
c14n
.
c14n
(
el
),
form
.
getChildren
()))
content
=
self
.
n_o
+
self
.
n_s
+
self
.
encode_mpi
(
d
)
+
pubkey_b
+
self
.
form_b
+
form_b2
old_c_s
=
self
.
c_s
mac_b
=
self
.
hmac
(
self
.
ks_s
,
content
)
id_b
=
self
.
encrypt
(
mac_b
)
m_b
=
self
.
hmac
(
self
.
km_s
,
self
.
encode_mpi
(
old_c_s
)
+
id_b
)
return
(
xmpp
.
DataField
(
name
=
'
identity
'
,
value
=
base64
.
b64encode
(
id_b
)),
\
xmpp
.
DataField
(
name
=
'
mac
'
,
value
=
base64
.
b64encode
(
m_b
)))
def
negotiate_e2e
(
self
,
sigmai
):
self
.
negotiated
=
{}
request
=
xmpp
.
Message
()
...
...
@@ -347,8 +443,8 @@ class EncryptedStanzaSession(StanzaSession):
x
.
addChild
(
node
=
xmpp
.
DataField
(
name
=
'
modp
'
,
typ
=
'
list-single
'
,
options
=
map
(
lambda
x
:
[
None
,
x
],
modp_options
)))
dhhashes
=
map
(
lambda
x
:
self
.
make_dh
hash
(
x
),
modp_options
)
x
.
addChild
(
node
=
xmpp
.
DataField
(
name
=
'
dhhashes
'
,
typ
=
'
hidden
'
,
value
=
dhhashes
))
x
.
addChild
(
node
=
self
.
make_dh
field
(
modp_options
,
sigmai
)
)
self
.
sigmai
=
sigmai
self
.
form_a
=
''
.
join
(
map
(
lambda
el
:
xmpp
.
c14n
.
c14n
(
el
),
x
.
getChildren
()))
...
...
@@ -413,7 +509,7 @@ class EncryptedStanzaSession(StanzaSession):
if
not
'
logging
'
in
ask_user
:
not_acceptable
.
append
(
name
)
else
:
# some things are handled elsewhere, some things are not-implemented
#
XXX
some things are handled elsewhere, some things are not-implemented
pass
return
(
negotiated
,
not_acceptable
,
ask_user
)
...
...
@@ -487,8 +583,6 @@ class EncryptedStanzaSession(StanzaSession):
# 'Alice Accepts'
def
verify_options_alice
(
self
,
form
):
# 1. Verify that the ESession options selected by Bob are acceptable
negotiated
=
{}
ask_user
=
{}
not_acceptable
=
[]
...
...
@@ -531,52 +625,42 @@ class EncryptedStanzaSession(StanzaSession):
e
=
self
.
es
[
mod_p
]
self
.
d
=
self
.
decode_mpi
(
base64
.
b64decode
(
form
[
'
dhkeys
'
]))
if
(
not
1
<
self
.
d
<
(
p
-
1
)):
raise
exceptions
.
NegotiationError
,
"
invalid DH value
'
d
'"
self
.
k
=
self
.
sha256
(
self
.
encode_mpi
(
self
.
powmod
(
self
.
d
,
x
,
p
)
))
self
.
k
=
self
.
get_shared_secret
(
self
.
d
,
x
,
p
)
result
.
addChild
(
node
=
xmpp
.
DataField
(
name
=
'
FORM_TYPE
'
,
value
=
'
urn:xmpp:ssn
'
))
result
.
addChild
(
node
=
xmpp
.
DataField
(
name
=
'
accept
'
,
value
=
'
1
'
))
result
.
addChild
(
node
=
xmpp
.
DataField
(
name
=
'
nonce
'
,
value
=
base64
.
b64encode
(
self
.
n_o
)))
result
.
addChild
(
node
=
xmpp
.
DataField
(
name
=
'
dhkeys
'
,
value
=
base64
.
b64encode
(
self
.
encode_mpi
(
e
))))
secrets
=
gajim
.
interface
.
list_secrets
(
self
.
conn
.
name
,
self
.
jid
.
getStripped
())
rshashes
=
[
self
.
hmac
(
self
.
n_s
,
rs
)
for
rs
in
secrets
]
# XXX add some random fake rshashes here
self
.
kc_s
,
self
.
km_s
,
self
.
ks_s
=
self
.
generate_initiator_keys
(
self
.
k
)
rshashes
.
sort
()
if
self
.
sigmai
:
self
.
kc_o
,
self
.
km_o
,
self
.
ks_o
=
self
.
generate_responder_keys
(
self
.
k
)
self
.
verify_bobs_identity
(
form
,
True
)
else
:
secrets
=
gajim
.
interface
.
list_secrets
(
self
.
conn
.
name
,
self
.
jid
.
getStripped
())
rshashes
=
[
self
.
hmac
(
self
.
n_s
,
rs
)
for
rs
in
secrets
]
rshashes
=
[
base64
.
b64encode
(
rshash
)
for
rshash
in
rshashes
]
result
.
addChild
(
node
=
xmpp
.
DataField
(
name
=
'
rshashes
'
,
value
=
rshashes
)
)
# XXX add some random fake
rshashes
here
rshashes
.
sort
(
)
form_a2
=
''
.
join
(
map
(
lambda
el
:
xmpp
.
c14n
.
c14n
(
el
),
result
.
getChildren
()))
rshashes
=
[
base64
.
b64encode
(
rshash
)
for
rshash
in
rshashes
]
result
.
addChild
(
node
=
xmpp
.
DataField
(
name
=
'
rshashes
'
,
value
=
rshashes
))
result
.
addChild
(
node
=
xmpp
.
DataField
(
name
=
'
dhkeys
'
,
value
=
base64
.
b64encode
(
self
.
encode_mpi
(
e
))))
self
.
kc_s
,
self
.
km_s
,
self
.
ks_s
=
self
.
generate_initiator_keys
(
self
.
k
)
# MUST securely destroy K unless it will be used later to generate the final shared secret
old_c_s
=
self
.
c_s
mac_a
=
self
.
hmac
(
self
.
ks_s
,
self
.
n_o
+
self
.
n_s
+
self
.
encode_mpi
(
e
)
+
self
.
form_a
+
form_a2
)
id_a
=
self
.
encrypt
(
mac_a
)
m_a
=
self
.
hmac
(
self
.
km_s
,
self
.
encode_mpi
(
old_c_s
)
+
id_a
)
# check for a retained secret
# if none exists, prompt the user with the SAS
if
self
.
sas_algs
==
'
sas28x5
'
:
self
.
sas
=
self
.
sas_28x5
(
m_a
,
self
.
form_b
)
result
.
addChild
(
node
=
xmpp
.
DataField
(
name
=
'
identity
'
,
value
=
base64
.
b64encode
(
id_a
)))
result
.
addChild
(
node
=
xmpp
.
DataField
(
name
=
'
mac
'
,
value
=
base64
.
b64encode
(
m_a
)))
for
datafield
in
self
.
make_alices_identity
(
result
,
e
):
result
.
addChild
(
node
=
datafield
)
feature
.
addChild
(
node
=
result
)
self
.
send
(
accept
)
self
.
status
=
'
identified-alice
'
if
self
.
sigmai
:
self
.
status
=
'
active
'
self
.
enable_encryption
=
True
else
:
self
.
status
=
'
identified-alice
'
# 4.5 esession accept (bob)
def
accept_e2e_bob
(
self
,
form
):
...
...
@@ -594,31 +678,13 @@ class EncryptedStanzaSession(StanzaSession):
e
=
self
.
decode_mpi
(
base64
.
b64decode
(
form
[
'
dhkeys
'
]))
p
=
dh
.
primes
[
self
.
modp
]
if
(
self
.
sha256
(
self
.
encode_mpi
(
e
))
!=
self
.
He
)
or
(
not
1
<
e
<
(
p
-
1
)):
raise
exceptions
.
NegotiationError
,
"
invalid DH value
'
e
'"
k
=
self
.
sha256
(
self
.
encode_mpi
(
self
.
powmod
(
e
,
self
.
y
,
p
)))
k
=
self
.
get_shared_secret
(
e
,
self
.
y
,
p
)
self
.
kc_o
,
self
.
km_o
,
self
.
ks_o
=
self
.
generate_initiator_keys
(
k
)
# 4.5.2 verifying alice's identity
id_a
=
base64
.
b64decode
(
form
[
'
identity
'
])
m_a
=
base64
.
b64decode
(
form
[
'
mac
'
])
m_a_calculated
=
self
.
hmac
(
self
.
km_o
,
self
.
encode_mpi
(
self
.
c_o
)
+
id_a
)
if
m_a_calculated
!=
m_a
:
raise
exceptions
.
NegotiationError
,
'
calculated m_a differs from received m_a
'
mac_a
=
self
.
decrypt
(
id_a
)
macable_children
=
filter
(
lambda
x
:
x
.
getVar
()
not
in
(
'
mac
'
,
'
identity
'
),
form
.
getChildren
())
form_a2
=
''
.
join
(
map
(
lambda
el
:
xmpp
.
c14n
.
c14n
(
el
),
macable_children
))
mac_a_calculated
=
self
.
hmac
(
self
.
ks_o
,
self
.
n_s
+
self
.
n_o
+
self
.
encode_mpi
(
e
)
+
self
.
form_a
+
form_a2
)
if
mac_a_calculated
!=
mac_a
:
raise
exceptions
.
NegotiationError
,
'
calculated mac_a differs from received mac_a
'
self
.
verify_alices_identity
(
form
)
# 4.5.4 generating bob's final session keys
...
...
@@ -635,11 +701,6 @@ class EncryptedStanzaSession(StanzaSession):
# other shared secret, we haven't got one.
oss
=
''
# check for a retained secret
# if none exists, prompt the user with the SAS
if
self
.
sas_algs
==
'
sas28x5
'
:
self
.
sas
=
self
.
sas_28x5
(
m_a
,
self
.
form_b
)
k
=
self
.
sha256
(
k
+
srs
+
oss
)
# XXX I can skip generating ks_o here
...
...
@@ -704,24 +765,7 @@ class EncryptedStanzaSession(StanzaSession):
# 4.6.2 Verifying Bob's Identity
m_b
=
base64
.
b64decode
(
form
[
'
mac
'
])
id_b
=
base64
.
b64decode
(
form
[
'
identity
'
])
m_b_calculated
=
self
.
hmac
(
self
.
km_o
,
self
.
encode_mpi
(
self
.
c_o
)
+
id_b
)
if
m_b_calculated
!=
m_b
:
raise
exceptions
.
NegotiationError
,
'
calculated m_b differs from received m_b
'
mac_b
=
self
.
decrypt
(
id_b
)
macable_children
=
filter
(
lambda
x
:
x
.
getVar
()
not
in
(
'
mac
'
,
'
identity
'
),
form
.
getChildren
())
form_b2
=
''
.
join
(
map
(
lambda
el
:
xmpp
.
c14n
.
c14n
(
el
),
macable_children
))
mac_b_calculated
=
self
.
hmac
(
self
.
ks_o
,
self
.
n_s
+
self
.
n_o
+
self
.
encode_mpi
(
self
.
d
)
+
self
.
form_b
+
form_b2
)
if
mac_b_calculated
!=
mac_b
:
raise
exceptions
.
NegotiationError
,
'
calculated mac_b differs from received mac_b
'
self
.
verify_bobs_identity
(
form
,
False
)
# Note: If Alice discovers an error then she SHOULD ignore any encrypted content she received in the stanza.
if
self
.
negotiated
[
'
logging
'
]
==
'
mustnot
'
:
...
...
@@ -751,21 +795,30 @@ class EncryptedStanzaSession(StanzaSession):
# in retrospect, this is horribly inadequate.
return
(
self
.
decode_mpi
(
self
.
random_bytes
(
bytes
))
%
(
top
-
bottom
))
+
bottom
def
make_dhhash
(
self
,
modp
):
p
=
dh
.
primes
[
modp
]
g
=
dh
.
generators
[
modp
]
def
make_dhfield
(
self
,
modp_options
,
sigmai
):
dhs
=
[]
for
modp
in
modp_options
:
p
=
dh
.
primes
[
modp
]
g
=
dh
.
generators
[
modp
]
x
=
self
.
srand
(
2
**
(
2
*
self
.
n
-
1
),
p
-
1
)
x
=
self
.
srand
(
2
**
(
2
*
self
.
n
-
1
),
p
-
1
)
# XXX this may be a source of performance issues
e
=
self
.
powmod
(
g
,
x
,
p
)
# XXX this may be a source of performance issues
e
=
self
.
powmod
(
g
,
x
,
p
)
self
.
xes
[
modp
]
=
x
self
.
es
[
modp
]
=
e
self
.
xes
[
modp
]
=
x
self
.
es
[
modp
]
=
e
He
=
self
.
sha256
(
self
.
encode_mpi
(
e
))
if
sigmai
:
dhs
.
append
(
base64
.
b64encode
(
self
.
encode_mpi
(
e
)))
name
=
'
dhkeys
'
else
:
He
=
self
.
sha256
(
self
.
encode_mpi
(
e
))
dhs
.
append
(
base64
.
b64encode
(
He
))
name
=
'
dhhashes
'
return
base64
.
b64encode
(
He
)
return
xmpp
.
DataField
(
name
=
name
,
typ
=
'
hidden
'
,
value
=
dhs
)
# a faster version of (base ** exp) % mod
# taken from <http://lists.danga.com/pipermail/yadis/2005-September/001445.html>
...
...
This diff is collapsed.
Click to expand it.
Preview
0%
Loading
Try again
or
attach a new file
.
Cancel
You are about to add
0
people
to the discussion. Proceed with caution.
Finish editing this message first!
Save comment
Cancel
Please
register
or
sign in
to comment